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FORDIHAM LAW REVIEW
substance that would stupefy his senses, retard his muscular and nervous reac-
tion, and impair, if not destroy, the perfect co-ordination of eye, brain and
muscles that is essential to safe driving. After Miller voluntarily rendered him-
self unfit to operate a car properly he undertook to drive his automobile, a poten-
tially lethal machine, down a well traveled highway. His conduct in doing this
was distinctly anti-social, and the jury was amply authorized in saying by
their verdict that he was exhibiting a 'wanton disregard of the rights and safety
of others'."'51 The foregoing language is generally expressive of all jurisdictions
in which punitive damages have been allowed in similar fact situations. In at
least one instance the court has come close to declaring punitive liability as a
matter of law. 52
CONCLUSION
The broad principles of law governing the question of punitive damages in
New York are fairly well defined. Neither public policy 3 nor criminal liability54
have deterred the courts. Aggravated negligence will serve as a sufficient basis
for such damages and all facts tending to prove wantonness and recklessness are
admissible.55 Provided, then, that the pleading is proper, even an admission by
the defendant of liability for compensatory damages would not preclude the
plaintiff from offering evidence of the defendant's intoxication on the question
of punitive damages.50 Noteworthy, too, is another course open to a plaintiff
who has been injured by an intoxicated person. By statute he is permitted a
cause of action against anyone who has unlawfully sold intoxicants to the in-
ebriate or unlawfully assisted him in obtaining liquor, and against whom he has
a right to recover punitive as well as compensatory damages.r,7 Aside from this
remedy, however, when the question of the drunken driver's liability for punitive
damages is finally decided in New York, the courts will probably place con-
siderable emphasis upon the fact of his intoxication in much the same manner
as is now done in motor vehicle homicide cases.
STATUS OF THE LAW IN NEW YORK CONCERNING
TORT LIABILITY OF HOSPITALS
TRUST FUND THEORY
As a general rule a master is liable for the torts of his servants committed in
the course of their employment.1 Some jurisdictions recognize as an exception
51. Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 248, 210 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1948).
52. Southland Broadcasting Co. v. Tracy, 210 Miss. 836, 50 So. 2d 572 (1951).
53. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
54. Taylor v. Church, 8 N.Y. 452 (1853).
55. De Marasse v. Wolfe, - Misc.----, 140 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
56. Sheldon v. Bauman, 19 App. Div. 61, 45 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (1st Dep't 1897).
57. N.Y. Civil Rights Law §16.
1. A citizen cannot sue the United States or a state without its consent under the
theory that the sovereign can do no wrong. Prosser, Torts § 109 (2d ed. 1955). The federal
government waived part of its immunity by the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act
[Vol. 25
to this rule the immunity from suit enjoyed by charitable institutions. Attempts
to justify this charitable immunity has led to the development of various legal
theories. The earliest theory of charitable immunity, the trust fund theory,
found its origin in Heriot's Hospital v. Ross2 over one hundred years ago. The
rationale was that the contributions to the hospital became part of a trust fund,
and to pay damages from this fund would be contrary to the purpose for which
the fund was established.3  The Heriot case was later overruled in England,,
but a Massachusetts court, apparently in ignorance of the fact that England had
already repudiated the rule, introduced the trust fund doctrine into the United
States in McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,6 and Maryland followed
suit shortly thereafter.6 It is interesting to note that the court in the McDonald
case implied in dicta that recovery would have been allowed if the hospital had
not exercised due care in the selection of its employees.7 This is inconsistent with
the fundamental principle of the theory.
Although the trust fund theory has been accepted in several jurisdictions,8 it
has met with general disapproval in this country.0 The reasoning behind its re-
jection found it inconsistent with the fundamental idea of government to sub-
jugate general laws to the will of any one person or group.10 A more basic ob-
jection to the trust fund theory is that under its reasoning, a person may suffer
a wrong and be left without adequate redress. Under a normal trust the trustee
is a principal and is personally liable. However, in a charitable corporation, the
directors do not hold title and therefore have no personal liability. If the prop-
erty owned by the corporation is then considered a trust fund, the injured party
in 1946. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346. Approximately one-half of the states have also waived
governmental immunity. See Nutting, Legislative Practice Regarding Tort Claims Against
The State, 4 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1939).
2. 12 Clark & Fin. 507, S Eng. Rep. 1503 (1346).
3. "To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to those objects
whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be to divert it to a completely
different purpose." Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 513, 8 Eng. Rep. 1503,
1910 (H.L. 1846).
4. Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866).
S. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
6. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1884).
7. 'i... [I]f due care has been used by them [the trustees] in the elcction of their
inferior agents, even if the injury has occurred by the negligence of such agents, it [the
trust fund] cannot be made responsible." McDonald v. Mhnanchusetts General Hospital,
120 Mass. 432 (1876).
S. Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Ale. 403, 78 At. 893 (1910); Maretick v.
South Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Il. App. 438, 17 N.E2d 1012 (1938).
9. Powers v. M-assachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901); Tucker
v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Hordern v. Salvation Army,
199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.. 626 (1910); Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 RI. 22, 85 At. 120
(1912); Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914).
10. "The doctrine that the will of an individual shall exempt either persons or property
from the operation of general laws is inconsistent with the fundamental idea of governmenL
It permits the will of the subject to nullify the will of the people." Basabo v. Salvation
Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 At. 120, 127 (1912).
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is precluded from recovery except perhaps from the normally financially incap-
able servant. It is not only inequitable, but also legally unsound, yet the states
which have adopted it show no sign of abandoning it.
REJECTION OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Immunity is sometimes granted under the theory that public policy dictates
that respondeat superior should not apply in the case of charitable organiza-
tions." It has been said: "The reason for this rule is, that acting for the bene-
fit of the public . .. does not involve such a private pecuniary interest as lies
at the foundation of the doctrine of respondeat superior."' 2 However most courts
refuse to accept this argument,' 3 and hold that in the best interests of the
public, respondeat superior should apply to charitable as well as to profit-making
organizations.' 4
IMPLIED WAIVER THEORY
The majority of the jurisdictions which recognize charitable immunity do so
under the implied waiver theory. Under this doctrine, a patient who takes ad-
vantage of the services of a charitable institution impliedly waives his right to
sue for injuries he may suffer.'5 This theory, of course, does not preclude recov-
ery by a stranger who does not avail himself of the benefits of the charity, and
11. Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N.E. 855 (1906); Bachman v. Young Women's
Christian Ass'n, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W.751 (1922).
12. Farrigan v. Pevear, 193 Mass. 147, 78 N.E. 855, 856 (1906).
13. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915); Welch v. Frisbie
Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939); Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla.
687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940) ; Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 AtI. 120 (1912).
14. ". . . [T]he defendant corporation, although it is a charitable corporation, is liable,
as any other corporation, for injuries to third persons caused by the negligence of Its serv-
ants . . . even though it is not shown or alleged that there has been any lack of care or
diligence on the part of the defendant in the selection or retention of such servants or agents.
We believe that public policy does not require any such exemption from liability as is
claimed by the defendant in this case, but, on the contrary, that such exemption would be
contrary to true public policy." Basabo v. Salvation Army, 35 R.I. 22, 85 AtI. 120, 129
(1912).
15. Powers v. Massachusetts Hemeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901); Hos-
pital of St. Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S. E. 13 (1914); BurdeU v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 Pac. 1008 (1918). In speaking of charitable organiza-
tions a court has said: "The purity of their aims may not justify their torts; but, if a
suffering man avails himself of their charity, he takes the risks of malpractice, if their
charitable agents have been carefully selected." Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic
Hospital, supra at 304. But see Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 826 (D.C.
Cir. 1942), where the court in speaking of the implied waiver theory said: "Few hospitals
would announce a policy of requiring such a waiver as a condition of entrance, and few
patients would enter under such a condition unless forced to do so by poverty. In that case
there could be no real choice. The idea of waiver, therefore, as implied from reception of
benefits amounts merely to imposing immunity as a rule of law in the guise of assumed con-
tract or renunciation of right, when all other reasons are found insufficient to support the
distinction. When the benefit turns into injury which aggravates the original ill, all basis
for the waiver and all 'consideration' for it fail."
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thus cannot be held to have waived any rights. There is a split of authority
among the jurisdictions which recognize the waiver theory, as to whether a pay-
ing beneficiary may recover against a charitable institution. Some courts deny
recovery upon the ground that the payment made is an outright donation to
the charity. 16 Other courts,1 7 adopting a more realistic view, permit recovery,
reasoning that the relationship is no different from the one which exists between
a paying patient and a private, non-charitable hospital.
In the United States today eleven states grant full immunity'6 to charitable
organizations under the trust fund theory. Two states impose liability, but
recognizing the trust fund theory, limit execution of judgment 0 to non-charitable
funds such as insurance and money obtained from paying patients. The states
which apply the doctrine of implied waiver are divided into two categories. One
group precludes suits by both paying and non-paying beneficiaries and permits
only strangers to recover 20 while the second group allows recovery by both
strangers and paying beneficiaries. - ' Finally, four states recognize no doctrine
of charitable immunity,2 2 and impose full liability on eleemosynary institutions.
Legal writers have been vociferous in their criticism of the various theories of
16. Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901); Bianchi
v. South Park Presbyterian Church, 123 N.J.L. 325, 8 A.2d 567 (1939); Hospital of St.
Vincent of Paul v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914).
17. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 6S So. 4 (1915); Silva v. Providence
Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1939) ; Sisters Of The Sorrowful Mother v. Zcidler,
183 Okla. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (1938).
18. Included in this group are Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Af.M-chu-
setts, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Wisconsin. Arlansas Valley Coop-
erative Rural Elec. Co. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W.Zd 538 (1940) ; Maretick v. South
Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Ill. App. 4SS, 17 N.E.2d 1012 (1938); Loeffler v. Trustees
of Sheppard & Enoch Pratt Hospital, 130 Mid. 265, 100 At. 301 (1917); Farrigan ,. Pevear,
193 Mass. 147, 78 N.E. 855 (1906); Bachman v. Young Women's Christian As'n, 179 Wis.
178, 191 N.W. 751 (1922). See also cases cited in Georgetowvn College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810, 818 (D.C.Cir. 1942).
19. O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P.2d 835 (1939);
Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S.W.2d 284 (1938).
20. Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska-, New Jersey, North
Carolina, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia and Washington are in this group. Andrews v.
Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939); Bianchi v. South Park
Presbyterian Church, 123 N.J.L. 325, 8 A.2d 567 (1939); Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul v.
Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13 (1914). See also cases cited in Georgetown College v.
Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
21. This category includes Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Oklahoma and
Utah. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 6S So. 4 (1915); Silva v. Providence
Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939) ; Sisters Of The Sorrowful Mother v. Zeidler,
183 Okla. 454, 82 P.2d 996 (1938). See also cases cited in Georgetown College v. Hughes,
130 F.2d 810, 819 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
22. McInerny v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 122 Mlinn. 10, 141 N.W. S37 (1913); Welch
v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939); Sheehan v. North Country
Community Hospital, 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 28 (1937); Avdlone v. St. John's Hospital,
165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
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immunity, and favor full liability.23 They point out that the doctrines are based
on rather dubious legal fictions and cause undue hardship to injured persons who
often find themselves without a remedy. 24 A good intention is usually no defense
to a tort, and it is well established that even a volunteer who undertakes a duty
is required by law to exercise reasonable care.
25
DOWNFALL OF CHARITABLE IMMUNITY IN NEW YoRK
The law in New York has run the gamut in relation to the doctrine of
charitable immunity, before finally repudiating all of the theories and imposing
full liability on eleemosynary institutions. This comment will deal solely with
the tort liability of hospitals. Although hospitals have been deprived of charitable
immunity in this state, they may at times escape tort liability under the inde-
pendent contractor theory.
The trust fund theory was repudiated in New York in Hordern v. Salvation
Army.26 The court stated that the implied waiver theory was the law of New
York, but permitted plaintiff to recover since he was a stranger and could not
be deemed to have waived his rights.
A landmark case on the subject of hospital liability was Schloendorff v. Society
Of The New York Hospital27 which was decided in 1914 when charitable
immunity was still the vogue. A surgeon operated on plaintiff, a paying patient,
without her consent. The court maintained that plaintiff was a beneficiary of the
charity in spite of the fact that she was a paying patient, considering such
payment a contribution to the charity. However, this case involved a battery,
and the court was unwilling to extend the implied waiver theory to intentional
torts. The court held that the relation existing between the hospital and the
surgeon was not one of master and servant so as to bring the case within
the doctrine of respondeat superior. The surgeon was an independent contractor,
and the hospital was not liable for his torts if it had exercised due care in select-
ing him. A hospital does not undertake to treat a patient itself, but merely
23. Prosser, Torts §109 (2d ed. 1955) ; Harper, Torts §294 (1933) ; Note, 29 Iowa L. Rev.
624 (1944); Note, 2 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 660 (1949).
24. ". .. [Tlhe immunity of charitable corporations in tort is based upon very dubious
grounds. It would seem that a sound social policy ought, in fact to require such organizations
to make just compensation for harm legally caused by their activities under the same cir-
cumstances as individuals before they carry on their charitable activities. The policy of the
law requiring individuals to be just before generous seems equally applicable to charitable
corporations. To require an injured individual to forego compensation for harm when he Is
otherwise entitled thereto, because the injury was committed by the servants of a charity,
is to require him to make an unreasonable contribution to the charity, against his will, and
a rule of law imposing such burdens can not be regarded as socially desirable nor consistent
with sound policy." Harper, Torts §294 (1933).
25. "One who undertakes to aid another must do so with due care. Whether the Good
Samaritan rides an ass, a Cadillac, or picks up hitchhikers in a Model T, he must ride with
forethought and caution. . . . Charity suffereth long and is kind, but in the common law it
cannot be careless. When it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes actionable wrongdoing."
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 113 F.2d 810, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
26. 199 N.Y. 233, 92 N.E. 626 (1910).
27. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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procures physicians for this purpose. The plaintiff maintained that the hospital
was liable nevertheless, since the nurse involved in the case was a servant of the
hospital. To this argument the court replied that the nurse was not a serant
of the hospital since " . . . nurses are employed to carry out the orders of the
physicians, to whose authority they are subject."2 8 Thus we see the Court
of Appeals, unable to apply the waiver theory because of the unusual facts of the
case, employing a new approach to the question of hospital liability. This was
the birth of the independent contractor theory which applies today in New York
to negligentm as well as intentional torts.
The deterioration of the idea of charitable immunity which had begun in the
Hordern case gained momentum in Phillips v. Buffalo Gceral Hospital. A
judgment for plaintiff, a paying patient who was injured through the negligence
of an orderly, was reversed by the Appellate Division on the ground of implied
waiver. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint on the
basis of the independent contractor theory, holding that at times, as in the instant
case, an orderly is an independent contractor when he performs the work of a
nurse.30 The court severely criticized the waiver theory, and made it quite clear
that its affirmance was not based on that doctrine.3 '
Since the criticism of the waiver theory in the Phillips case was merely dicta,
the doctrine was technically still valid law until 1937 when it was repudiated
by a square holding in Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital. This
case marked the termination of charitable immunity in New York; henceforth
there would be no distinction in the tort liability of charitable and profit-making
hospitals in this state.33 Once the doctrine of immunity began to erode, the
courts of New York were unable to find any logical terminus short of full
liability.
LiABInITY OF HosPITAis IN NEw YORK TODAY
Hospitals may be separated into three categories: charitable, public, and
proprietary or private. The first two classes have in the past enjoyed immunity
in varying degrees, but, as we have seen, the doctrine of charitable immunity has
been completely repudiated in New York by case decision. The same effect was
achieved in reference to public hospitals when New York state waived its im-
28. Schloendorff v. Society Of The New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 132, 105 NX.. 92,
94 (1914).
29. Sutherland v. New York Polyclinic Medical School & Hospital, 273 App Div. 29, 75
N.Y.S.2d 135 (1st Dep't 1947), aff'd mem., 293 N.Y. 682, 82 N.E2d 583 (1943).
30. 239 N.Y. 13S, 146 N.E. 199 (1924). This holding has been overruled by Berg. v. New
York Soc'y For The Relief of The Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499, 154 N.Y.S2d 455
(1956).
31. "We are reluctant to permit an affirmance of the judgment to pans as an acceptance
of the theory that defendant's exemption from liability must rest on the v.aiver doctrine2'
Phillips v. Buffalo Gen. Hospital, 239 N.Y. 188, 189, 146 N.E. 199 (1924).
32. 273 N.Y. 163, 7 N.E.2d 2S (1937).
33. See Bakal v. University Heights Sanitarium, 277 App. Div. 572, 101 N.YS.2d 335
(1st Dep't 1950), aff'd mem., 302 N.Y. 870, 1CO N.E.2d 51 (1951).
34. See Goldwater v. Citizens Cas. Co., 7 N.Y.S.2d 242 (N.Y. City lunic. Ct. 1938);
25 Fordham L. Rev. 143, 145 (1956).
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munity to suit by the passage of section eight of the Court of Claims Act.a3' It has
been held that this waiver of state immunity also acts as a waiver of the immu-
nity of its political subdivisions.3 6 Therefore, a public hospital may be sued as
readily as a charitable or private one.
The independent contractor doctrine is an exception to the general rule of
imputed liability under the rule of respondeat superior. Under the independent
contractor theory a hospital is not liable for torts committed by doctors and
nurses37 if due care has been exercised in their selection." This is based on the
reasoning that the hospital acts only to procure for the patient the services
of these individuals, and in no way controls their professional judgment and
actions in actually conferring these services. However, where no professional
skill or judgment is required, the ordinary rules of respondeat superior apply
in determining the hospital's liability.3 9 Therefore, we observe the courts
applying the "professional administrative" test in order to decide whether or not
the hospital is liable. In Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital the court said:
"The liability [of the hospital] depends not so much upon the title of the indi-
vidual whose act or omission causes the injury, as upon the character of the
act itself."'40 This test was followed until the Court of Appeals recently held
in Berg v. New York Society For The Relief of The Ruptured and Crippled4
that the hospital can escape liability under the independent contractor theory
only when the negligence occurs in the performance of a professional act by a
doctor or nurse. Thus it is no longer a defense for the hospital to claim that
an orderly was performing the professional duties of a nurse,42 or that a tech-
nician was engaged in a task which required professional skill and judgment. 43
The Court of Appeals has imposed a further limitation on the independent
contractor doctrine by recently holding: "We look to the 'medical-administrative'
distinction only when the negligence occurred during treatment or care of a
patient and where the physician acts independently. '44 Therefore we see that
in New York today a hospital can escape tort liability under the independent
35. "The state hereby waives its immunity from liability . . . and consents to have the
same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the
supreme court against individuals or corporations. . . ." N.Y. Court of Claims Act § 8.
36. McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947); Bernadine v.
City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604 (1945).
37. Schloendorff v. Society of The New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
38. A hospital is liable for negligence in the performance of a professional act by a nurse
if it did not exercise due care in selecting her. Bryant v. Presbyterian Hospital, 304 N.Y.
538, 110 N.E.2d 391 (1953).
39. Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital, 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832 (4th Dep't 1946),
aff'd, 296 N.Y. 936, 73 N.E.2d 117 (1947).
40. 284 N.Y. 176, 180, 30 N.E.2d 373, 374 (1940).
41. 1 N.Y.2d 499, 154 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1956).
42. See Andrews v. Roosevelt Hospital, 259 App. Div. 733, 18 N.Y.S.2d 447 (2d Dep't
1940).
43. See Berg. v. New York Soc'y For The Relief of The Ruptured and Crippled, 276
App. Div. 783, 146 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1st Dep't 1955); Rabasco v. New Rochelle Hospital Ass'n,
266 App. Div. 971, 44 N.Y.S.2d 293 (2d Dep't 1943).
44. Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc., 308 N.Y. 116, 122, 123 N.E.2d 801, 804 (1954).
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contractor doctrine only when the tort was committed during treatment or care,
by a doctor or nurse who was selected with due care, and who, at the time, was
engaged in the independent performance of a professional act.
WHAT Is A PROFESSIONAL AcT?
Two of the requisites for the satisfaction of the independent contractor theory,
i.e., due care in selection and the undergoing of actual treatment at the time the
tort occurred, present no problem, being a question of fact in each case.
The difficulty arises in attempting to determine whether the act in question is an
administrative or professional one. The distinction is the basis of the inde-
pendent contractor theory in that the hospital merely procures professional
services for the patient, while it actually renders administrative services to him
through its servants.45 It is necessary to review the decisions, many of which
seem to be in direct conflict, in order to arrive at some rules which can be applied
in a given case in order to determine whether a given act is professional or
administrative.
HOT WATER BoTTLE CASES
In lacono v. New York Medical School and Hospital,0 a nurse put hot water
bottles in plaintiff's bed to warm it while plaintiff was in the operating room.
The bottles were not removed, plaintiff was burned, and the hospital was held
liable for administrative negligence. An opposite result was reached in Sztlhcr-
land v. New York Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital,4 7 although the only
fact distinguishing it from the lacono case was that the nurse put the bottles
in the bed while the patient was occupying it, and refused to remove them
when the patient complained. The court found for the defendant, holding that
the nurse was guilty of a failure of professional judgment. The Suthcrland case
was cited and followed in Wisner v. Syracuse Memorial Hospital'8 which arose
on identical facts. In McGuinn v. Knickerbocker Hospitalo the nurse burned
the patient with the hot water bottle during the course of surgery, and this court
also held it a professional act.
These cases are easily reconcilable if one keeps in mind the standard set forth
in the Dillon case, which states that it is the nature of the act, rather than the
title of the actor which determines whether the negligent act is professional or
45. "The legal basis for the distinction is that medical service, although procured by the
hospital, is professional service rendered to the patient by a doctor or nurse, and not service
rendered by the hospital through the agency of the doctor or nurse. Administrative work,
on the other hand, is part of the hospital service and is performed by servants of the hos-
pital, for whose administrative acts the hospital is responsible." Sutherland v. New York
Polyclinic Medical School and Hospital, 273 App. Div. 29, 30-31, 75 N.Y.S2d 135, 136 (lst
Dep't 1947).
46. 269 App. Div. 955, 5S N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1945), aft'd, 296 N.Y. 502, 6S N.E2d
450 (1946).
47. 273 App. Div. 29, 75 N.Y.S.2d 135 (1st Dep't 1947), alrd mem., 293 N.Y. 6S2, 82
N.E.2d 583 (1948).
4S. 274 App. Div. 1087, S6 N.Y.S.2d 150 (4th Dep't 1949).
49. 89 N.Y.S.2d 32 (Sup. Ct. 1949), afi'd, 276 App. Div. 1079, 97 N.Y.S.2d 186 (1st
Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 633, 97 N.E2d 760 (1951).
1956] COMMENTS
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administrative. The Berg case has repudiated only that part of the rule which
states that the hospital is not responsible for the professional act of one other
than a doctor or nurse. The converse still holds true; the hospital is liable for the
administrative negligence of a doctor or nurse. In the Iacono case the negligent
act was the failure to remove the hot water bottles before the patient was
returned to the bed. This was an act which could have been performed by any-
one; it required no professional judgment or skill. The fact that a nurse rather
than an orderly failed to perform it is immaterial under the aforesaid rule. In
the Sutherland and Wisner cases the nurse was dispensing medical treatment
to the patient. Although it may seem ironic, the fact that the patients com-
plained to the nurses in both cases did much to doom their causes of action.
The nurse in each case, exercising her professional judgment, apparently decided
that the therapeutic value of the hot water bottle treatment outweighed the
obvious discomfort which it caused the patient. Therefore we must conclude
that the negligent act will usually be deemed a professional one whenever some
discretion is required in determining how to apply a certain treatment, or when
to terminate it. From the McGuinn case we may infer that any act done by a
surgeon or nurse during surgery will be held to be professional. This would seem
to be a valid assumption since it is obvious that the hospital has no control over
these actions. The surgeon is definitely an independent contractor; the nurse
who assists him, if not an independent contractor, must be considered his servant
rather than the hospital's during the course of the operation."
WHERE PATIENT FALLS FROm BED OR TABLE
It is more difficult to reconcile the cases where, due to the negligence of
hospital personnel, a patient is injured when he falls from a bed or table. The
negligence in this type of case usually involves failure to actually watch the pa-
tient or failure to erect side boards on the bed. The difficulty in determining
the true state of the law concerning this problem stems from the apparent
reluctance of the Court of Appeals to write an opinion when this type of case
comes before it. The standard procedure has been for that tribunal to affirm
without opinion or merely by memorandum decisions.
Recovery Denied
In Andrews v. Roosevelt Hospital,5 ' an interne and an orderly placed the
patient on a narrow table in the examining room, and the patient fell from
the table soon after both of them left the room. The court in denying recovery
ruled that the departure of the interne was due to a failure of his professional
judgment. The court also refused to predicate liability on the action of an
orderly who usually engages in administrative tasks. It was held that his duty
as an orderly terminated when he delivered the patient to the examining room,
50. ". . . [N]urses are employed to carry out the orders of the physicians, to whose
authority they are subject." Schloendorff v. Society Of The New York Hospital, 211 N.Y.
125, 132, 105 N.E. 92, 94 (1914).
51. 259 App. Div. 733, 18 N.Y.S.2d 447 (2d Dep't 1940).
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and had he remained when the interne left he would be performing the pro-
fessional task of attending the patient.U2
The decision in Lee v. Glens Falls Hospitar3 hinged on the question of what
constitutes "caring for a patient." The patient after her operation was placed
in a bed upon which side boards were erected. Although the surgeon told her to
keep close watch on the patient, the nurse left the room, and the patient was
injured when, in a semi-conscious state, she fell while attempting to climb over
the side boards. The Appellate Division by a three to two decision affirmed the
dismissal of the complaint, holding that the nurse had been engaged in the pro-
fessional act of caring for the patient. The dissent maintained that the nurse
had been engaged in the administrative duty of preventing the patient from
climbing out of bed, a task which requires neither judgment nor sklll.
In Pierson v. Wilson Memorial Hospital,54 a two year old child was admitted
to the defendant hospital and put in a crib, the sides of which were appro.imately
two feet high. The child's father warned the nurse that the infant was unusually
active and would probably climb from the crib unless he was restrained in some
way. No restraint was ordered, and the child fell and was injured while trying
to climb over the side of the crib. Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on the
ground that the decision whether or not to use additional restraint was a pro-
fessional one.55
Recovery Allowed
The Bickford v. Carson C. Peck Memorial Hospita70 involved a woman who,
while in labor and under the influence of drugs, fell from a bed which wasn't
equipped with side boards. In allowing a recovery by the plaintiff, the court
stated: "The negligence, as found by the jury, was of an administrative nature,
in that the servants of the defendant assigned the plaintiff to a particular bed for
occupancy and continued her in it up to the time of the accident."3 7
The fact situation of the Andrews case arose again in Petry v. Nassau
Hospital.5s The patient was placed on a table in the emergency room and, while
left unattended by a nurse, fell from the table. The Appellate Division in a
memorandum decision affirmed a judgment for plaintiff, citing the Bickford
case.
One of the few undisputed rules in this field of law was set forth in Ranclli
v. Society Of The New York Hospital.9 The plaintiff underwent an operation
52. In view of the holding of the Berg cas% i.e., the hospital is liable for even the profes-
sional nurse, a court today would predicate liability on the departure of the orderly under
these facts.
53. 265 App. Div. 607, 42 N.Y.S.2d 169 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 291 N.Y. 526, 50 N.E.2d 651
(1943).
54. 273 App. Div. 343, 78 N.Y.S.2d 146 (3d Dep't 1943).
55. The court stated in dicta that there would have been administrative negligence if a
decision to use additional restraint had been made but not executed.
56. 266 App. Div. 875, 43 N.Y.S.2d 20 (2d Dep't 1943).
57. Bickford v. Carson C. Peck Memorial Hospital, 266 App. Div. 875, 43 N.Y.S.2d 20,
21 (2d Dep't 1943).
58. 267 App. Div. 996, 48 N.Y.S.2d 227 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 293 N.Y. 937, 57
N.E.2d 753 (1944).
59. 269 App. Div. 906, 56 N.Y.S.2d 431 (2d Dep't 1945), aff'd mem., 29S N.Y. 850, 67
N.E.2d 257 (1946).
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and was put into a bed which had no side boards. Since the patient was restless,
the head nurse decided that side boards should be erected. Her order was not
carried out and plaintiff fell from the bed. The trial court held the hospital liable
on the ground of administrative negligence. Although a decision whether or not
to use side boards may have been an act of professional judgment, once the
decision to use them was made, failure to carry out the decision was adminis-
tractive negligence. The Appellate Division affirmed upon the authority of the
Petry and Bickford cases. This rule was reaffirmed in the case of Pivar v. Man-
hattan General, Inc60 which also held that a medical decision made by a
physician cannot be overruled by a special nurse hired by the patient. Once
a physician orders something done, failure to carry out these directives by the
hospital employees constitutes administrative negligence, regardless of counter-
manding orders by a nurse.
It is extremely difficult to reconcile these decisions and to extract many clear-
cut principles of law. It would seem that the Andrews case is no longer the law
in this state. The Petry case which involved nearly identical facts was subse-
quently decided in the same judicial department, and resulted in a contrary
finding. It is fair to assume that it is administrative negligence to leave a patient
unattended on an examining table, regardless of the title of the one doing so. No
amount of professional judgment can justify leaving a patient unattended in what
any reasonable man would recognize as a precarious position.
It is quite clear from the Pivar and the Ranelli cases and from dicta in the
Pierson case that once a professional decision has been made, the hospital is liable
for administrative negligence if it fails to carry out that decision.0 1 It would also
seem apparent from the holding of the Pierson case and dicta in the Pivar and
Ranelli cases that the decision whether or not to use some means to prevent
the patient from falling or climbing from a bed, as opposed to an examining
table, is a professional one.
The Lee and Bickford cases cannot be reconciled either with each other or with
any other cases in point. The court in the Lee case indulged in the circular
reasoning that since caring for a patient is the job of a professional person, all
of the aspects of caring for a patient require professional training and judgment.
Some aspects of caring for a patient undoubtedly require professional training,
but merely preventing the patient from climbing out of bed certainly does not.
The court, while paying lip-service to the well established rule that it is the
character of the act rather than the title of the actor which determines whether
or not the act is a professional one, actually contravened this rule. In addition,
the court failed to realize that there was administrative negligence when the
nurse failed to carry out the surgeon's professional directive that a close watch
be kept on the patient. The language of the court in the Bickford case0 2 on the
60. 279 App. Div. 522, 110 N.Y.S.2d 786 (1st Dep't 1952).
61. See note 55 supra.
62. "The negligence, as found by the jury, was of an administrative nature, in that the
servants of the defendant assigned the plaintiff to a particular bed for occupancy and con-
tinued her in it up to the time of the accident." Bickford v. Carson C. Peck Memorial Hos-
pital, 266 App. Div. 875, 43 N.Y.S.2d 20, 21 (2d Dep't 1943).
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other hand would seem to completely ignore the professional-administrative dis-
tinction, and impose almost absolute liability on the hospital.
SUICIDE CASES
The law seems fairly well settled when the hospital is charged with negligence
in failing to prevent a patient from injuring himself. Here the doctrine of fore-
seeability rather than the professional-administrative distinction appears to be
the most important factor. In Martindale v. Ncw York63 the plaintiff's intestate
was admitted to a state mental hospital. The hospital authorities were aware of the
fact that she had an uncontrollable desire to escape, but a nurse left the patient
unattended long enough for her to jump from a window. Judgment for plaintiff
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In another caseG4 the intestate was
admitted to the defendant hospital to undergo treatment for drug addiction. An
attendant permitted her to enter a drug store alone, where she purchased some
veronal. When the intestate returned to the hospital, she took the drug and
died as a result thereof. The hospital was held liable. The result of allowing the de-
cedent to enter the drug store alone was clearly foreseeable, and permitting her
to do so was administrative negligence.
ADm STRATVE DUTIES I.PINGING ON PROFESSIONAL ACTviTES
A new approach to the professional-administrative distinction and its relation
to foreseeability was introduced in the case of Santos v. Unity Hoskital.cs Plain-
tiff's intestate was left alone in the labor room of the defendant hospital while
the nurse went into the hall to answer the telephone. The patient became
mentally deranged due to intrapartum psychosis and jumped through the un-
barred window to her death. The trial court charged the jury that it could infer
negligence from either the defendant's failure to have bars on the windows or
from the fact that the nurse left the decedent temporarily unattended. The
Court of Appeals held that this charge was correct since it did not instruct
the jury that the lack of bars on the windows was, of itself, negligence. On the
contrary, the charge permitted the jury to consider the absence of bars along
with all the other facts as proof of negligence on the part of the hospital. Only
one question of fact had to be decided, i.e., was it negligence on the part of the
hospital to give the nurse the administrative duty of the phone, thus requiring
her to leave the patient unattended in a room with unbarred windows?c"
Any doubts as to the true import of the Santos decision were clarified by the
63. 269 N.Y. 554, 199 N.E. 667 (1935). See also Gries v. Long Island Home, Ltd., 274
App. Div. 938, 83 N.Y.S.2d 728 (2d Dep't 1948), wherein the defendant sanitarium was
aware that the decedent had suicidal tendencies, and was held liable for leaving him unat-
tended, during which time he jumped to his death.
64. Van Patter v. Charles B. Towns Hospital, 213 App. Div. 863, 209 N.Y. Supp. 935
(1st Dep't 1925), aff'd mem., 246 N.Y. 646, 159 N.E. 686 (1927).
65. 301 N.Y. 153, 93 N.E.2d 574 (1950).
66. The court assumed that the nurse while attending the patient was engaged in a
professional act. The court also held that the suicide was foreseeable becaue intrapartum
psychosis, although rare, is recognized by doctors as a risk connected with childbirth.
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Court of Appeals in Cadicamo v. Long Island College Hospital.6 7 In this case
a nurse placed a bare electric bulb close to the bedding of a newborn infant
in order to raise its temperature. The nurse then took some bottles to the base-
ment to be washed, and when she returned the crib was in flames. The Court of
Appeals reversed a judgment for defendant, and held that the Santos case was
controlling.68 The court ruled that although the application of heat was a pro-
fessional decision by the nurse, the taking of bottles to the basement was an
administrative task. The court stated: "We doubt whether at any time in the
development of the law defendant could claim immunity as to an act with which
it had thus interfered through the obtrusion of administrative functions into
the professional area." 69
MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Negligence has been alleged in regard to various other aspects of hospital
routine,70 and, as we have seen, recovery is dependent on a showing of adminis-
trative negligence when a doctor or nurse is involved. The issue of the status
of an act incident to the performance of a professional act arose in Rabasco v.
New Rochelle Hospital Ass'n.7 1 An x-ray technician asked plaintiff to hold his child
on the table, thus causing plaintiff to stand so close to the machine that he
received an electric shock. Judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint
was reversed by the Appellate Division. It was held that the jury could have
found that the technician was guilty of administrative negligence in instructing
the plaintiff to stand so close to the machine instead of summoning a nurse to
hold the child.12
A case in which the court allowed recovery on the basis of some rather dubious
reasoning was Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital." An interne and nurse who were
to give a blood transfusion to a certain patient inadvertently entered the wrong
room. When the patient told them that she wasn't supposed to receive blood,
they told her that her daughter had just donated it. In spite of the patient's
protests and claim that she had no daughter, the transfusion was given. Judg-
67. 308 N.Y. 196, 124 N.E.2d 279 (1954).
68. "In both cases, it was the administrative requirements of the hospital which took
from the patient the competent care and supervision to which she was entitled and which
constituted the additional factor that generated a tragedy." Cadicarno v. Long Island College
Hospital, 308 N.Y. 196, 203, 124 N.E.2d 279, 282 (1954).
69. Id. at 202, 124 N.E.2d at 281. When the court referred to the development of the
law, it was obviously referring to the development of the independent contractor doctrine,
rather than to the development of hospital liability in general.
70. See, e.g., Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596 (1940). The super-
visor of nurses had declared a certain morphine solution unfit for use, but failed to have It
destroyed. When plaintiff was given an injection of this solution and thereby was injured,
she received a judgment based on the administrative negligence of the supervisor.
71. 266 App. Div. 791, 44 N.Y.S.2d 293 (2d Dep't 1943).
72. Today, in light of the Berg case, the hospital would be liable even if the technician
were found guilty of only professional negligence. Nevertheless, the Rabasco decision is still
authority for the proposition that all acts incident to the performance of a professional act
are not necessarily professional themselves.
73. 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832 (4th Dep't 1946).
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ment for plaintiff was affirmed, the court holding that there was administrative
negligence, notwithstanding the fact that the actual giving of a transfusion is a
professional act. In speaking of the mistake made by the interne and nurse the
court said: "their entrance into the wrong room caused the professional nature
of their errand to cease."74 The court then went on to say that every employee
of a hospital has a duty to protect patients, a duty which the interne and nurse
had failed to perform. The legal soundness of this language must be questioned,
for to say that the interne has an administrative duty to protect the patient from
the interne's own professional negligence would be to destroy the distinction
between professional and administrative acts. The result of this case, however,
can be justified under the holding of the Rabasco case, i.e., acts incident to the
performance of a professional act are not necessarily professional acts them-
selves. Liability could have been based upon the fact that the interne and nurse
failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining whether the plaintiff was in fact
the patient for whom the transfusion was intended, especially in light of her
protests.
CONCLUSION
The independent contractor doctrine as applied in New York to determine
hospital liability has been subject to a great deal of valid criticism. 5 The theory
is based on the premise that physicians, internes and nurses are not subject to
supervision by hospital authorities, which is more true in theory than in fact.
The law has at times considered these persons servants, 0 and it would seem
likely that hospitals do also. In the latest attack on the doctrine, the Court
of Appeals hinted that the rule has outlived its usefulness,7 and will soon be
repudiated, at least in so far as it exempts the hospital from liability for the
professional acts of salaried doctors and nurses.7" This should come as no
74. Necolayff v. Genesee Hospital, 270 App. Div. 64S, 653, 61 N.Y.S.2d S32, S36 (4th
Dep't 1946).
75. See, e.g., Lee v. Glens Falls Hospital, 265 App. Div. 607, 616, 42 N.Y.S.2d 169, 177
(3d Dep't 1943), where the dissenting opinion stated: "... the patient is accepted undr
an implied agreement that he will receive such reasonable care and attention as the hospital
knows or should know his condition to require. There is no longer any good reason w;hy
a hospital, charitable, public, or otherwise, should not be responsible to paying patients for
the neglect of all its employees-medical as well as administrative."
76. In Matter of Bernstein v. Beth Israel Hospital, 236 N.Y. 268, 140 N.E. 694 (1923),
an interne was held to be an "employee" under the Workmen's Compensation AcL In
Mrachek v. Sunshine Biscuit, Inc. 303 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E2d S01 (1954), the court found
that the company doctor was a servant, although the actual holding of liability seems to
have been based on another ground.
77. "Therefore, without reviewing or revising the whole Shloendorff v. Society of New
York Hosp. rule... and without determining whether the rule itself has outlived its useful-
ness, we hold that this particular hospital ... is liable for her [technicians] negligence."
Berg v. New York Soc'y For The Relief of The Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N.Y.2d 499, -
154 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (1956).
73. "Mlodern hospitals hire on salary not only clerical, administrative and housekeeping
employees but also physicians, nurses and laboratory technicians of many kinds. ... . What
reason compels us to say that of all employees working in their employer's bu.lneses
(including charitable, educational, religious and governmental enterprices) the only ones for
whom the employers can escape liability are the employees of hospitals?" Ibid.
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surprise to anyone who has observed the process of evolution through which
the law in New York has gone in reaching its present state. The repudiation
of the doctrines of governmental and charitable immunity and the numerous
limitations which the courts have placed on the independent contractor doctrine,
indicate that the evolution is still in progress and will not be complete until
hospitals are held liable for the torts of every person in their employ.
